Feb 24, 2014
Will someone please explain to me how the UBS Puerto Rico sponsored closed-end bond funds (UBS Funds) managed to increase their Net Asset Values (NAVs) after most, if not all, of the Puerto Rico government and agency issued bonds held in the UBS Funds were downgraded to “junk” status? I am questioning whether the NAVs that UBS Puerto Rico reported for the week ending February 19, 2014 in the prior two weeks truly represent the actual NAVs of the UBS Funds. First, how did they manage to fairly price the bonds with the small number and size of Puerto Rico bond transactions in the marketplace? Most of the Puerto Rico bonds in the UBS funds are very thinly traded. Further, the prices of many of the Puerto Rico bond transactions have been all over the place because the trading is very volatile. Did UBS Puerto Rico get these prices from a matrix? Or has UBS Puerto Rico manipulated the Puerto Rico bond market through transactions with their closed-end bond funds? With the increasing number of arbitration claims relating to the UBS Puerto Rico closed-end bond funds, I am wondering whether UBS Puerto Rico is engaging in a trading strategy to pump up the NAVs and prices of the UBS Funds to reduce the Claimants’ damages in those arbitration proceedings. Whatever the reason, there is a slight upward trend in the NAVs of most of the UBS Funds as set forth below:
Continue Reading